Feature #9700

Persistence preset: Tor Browser security level

Added by DanOver 2015-07-07 09:52:08 . Updated 2020-04-21 14:22:41 .

Status:
In Progress
Priority:
Low
Assignee:
synthe
Category:
Persistence
Target version:
Start date:
2015-07-07
Due date:
% Done:

0%

Feature Branch:
Type of work:
Research
Blueprint:

Starter:
Affected tool:
Browser
Deliverable for:

Description


Subtasks


Related issues

Related to Tails - Bug #10481: Disable JavaScript by default Rejected 2015-11-04
Related to Tails - Feature #11417: Default torbutton security slider to "Medium-High" Rejected 2016-05-14
Related to Tails - Feature #15013: Consider setting Security Slider to "High" by default Resolved 2017-12-03
Has duplicate Tails - Feature #17645: Consider TOR security level remaining persistent after restart Duplicate

History

#1 Updated by intrigeri 2015-07-07 10:06:48

  • Category set to Persistence
  • Status changed from New to Confirmed
  • Priority changed from Normal to Low
  • Type of work changed from User interface design to Research
  • Affected tool set to Browser

Subject: Persistence preset: Tor Browser security slider setting

A way to persist the extensions.torbutton.security_slider pref would address this request and more. It would also make Tails’ UX closer to the Tor Browser’s one, so I’m triaging this ticket as a valuable feature request. Would be awesome if somebody worked on it :)

#2 Updated by DanOver 2015-07-07 10:21:38

Forgetting enable NoScript can compromise user security and we are all vulnerable to this. Forcing users to perform this action every initialization increases the chances for this problem from occurring.

#3 Updated by intrigeri 2015-07-07 10:40:58

  • Subject changed from NoScript enabled in persistence to Persistence preset: Tor Browser security slider setting
  • Description updated

#4 Updated by sajolida 2015-11-06 11:55:42

  • related to Bug #10481: Disable JavaScript by default added

#5 Updated by sajolida 2016-05-16 08:32:55

  • related to Feature #11417: Default torbutton security slider to "Medium-High" added

#6 Updated by synthe 2017-10-01 21:13:02

I would like to, very respectfully, propose that this issue be given higher priority. Nearly all of the most egregious, deanonymizing, 0-days against the TBB have required Javascript to be enabled. And even as we speak, exploits targeting javascript-enabled TBB are considered far less worthy of a 6-figure bounty than any capable of compromising Tails with Torbutton set to ‘High’ (https://www.deepdotweb.com/2017/09/28/government-contractor-offers-million-dollar-bounty-tor-0-days/)

In this respect, Tails (whose default settings are otherwise wisely chosen), is currently diverging from a default installation of TBB on, say, Debian, by reverting to the default, ‘Low’ Torbutton setting after each reboot. Having to double check that one has correctly changed the Torbutton slider every time Tails is started doesn’t lead to a comfortable user experience.

While I understand the desire to keep Tails accessible to novice users, and the extra work, and testing, required to implement fully automatised persistence for such a feature, I was thinking that perhaps a verified, tested, foolproof method to use Dotfiles persistence to persist one’s desired Torbutton settings (via prefs.js) be added to the documentation on tails.boum.org.

If the developers agree, I’d be honored to be able to help out :)

#7 Updated by intrigeri 2017-10-02 06:50:55

> If the developers agree, I’d be honored to be able to help out :)

Cool! What “Low” priority means on our Redmine, as per https://tails.boum.org/contribute/working_together/Redmine/, is “It would be good to have it, but nobody is volunteering to do it”, so by all means, please go ahead :)

Next steps:

  1. read https://tails.boum.org/contribute/how/code/
  2. think about how you think this should be implemented
  3. share your initial design/implementation plans on tails-dev@boum.org (and then it might be that the UX part of the discussion will be moved to the dedicated mailing list)

#8 Updated by synthe 2017-10-04 11:28:48

Dear intrigeri,

Thanks for the prompt response!

I’ve posted a few considerations and proposals in my third mail (the first two mails were really just test reports) to tails-dev: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2017-October/011742.html

#9 Updated by intrigeri 2017-10-08 06:45:43

  • Status changed from Confirmed to In Progress
  • Assignee set to synthe

#10 Updated by synthe 2017-10-08 21:22:19

Dear Intrigeri,

Thanks for your responses and input over on tails-dev. You were absolutely right - I see that a single user_pref (“extensions.torbutton.security_slider”, 1) is sufficient for Torbutton to set all its necessary parameters as prefs.js is parsed at tor-browser’s startup - thanks for the tip!

An entirely new separate persistence.conf entry (via a ‘Tor Browser Security Settings’ via the GUI) would indeed be the most elegant in the long term. It would also allow one to reliably persist Torbutton settings across reboots, thus faithfully replicating the behaviour of a normal, non-amnesic, TBB installation. As long the security_slider parameter alone is persisted from tor-browser, it should protect users against any other (possibly insecure) configuration choices from surviving reboot.

I’ll start by preparing a very simple, dotfiles-based, documentation-only suggestion, which would only require inclusion on the Tails’ website documentation and no changes to code for now. If that proves popular I’ll work on a feature branch which, if approved and merged, should reliably deal with the whole issue via a new ‘Configure Persistence’ GUI option.

Synthe

#11 Updated by synthe 2017-10-15 20:27:53

I’ve posted a git diff of my proposed commit to the Tails documentation, for a first, opt-in approach at dealing with this matter: https://mailman.boum.org/pipermail/tails-dev/2017-October/011783.html

It’s relatively predictable, but I’ve tested it on both the original stretch-based Tails 3.0, and the latest development build too to be sure.

Let me know what you think.

#12 Updated by Anonymous 2018-01-15 15:25:06

  • related to Feature #15013: Consider setting Security Slider to "High" by default added

#13 Updated by Anonymous 2018-08-18 11:57:56

  • Assignee changed from synthe to intrigeri
  • QA Check set to Ready for QA

It seems synthe wanted a review of their approach.

#14 Updated by intrigeri 2018-08-20 09:33:13

  • Assignee changed from intrigeri to synthe
  • QA Check deleted (Ready for QA)

u wrote:
> It seems synthe wanted a review of their approach.

I did that review and then we had a good discussion but AFAIK no merge-ready patch was submitted yet.

#15 Updated by sajolida 2020-04-21 14:22:41

  • Subject changed from Persistence preset: Tor Browser security slider setting to Persistence preset: Tor Browser security level

#16 Updated by sajolida 2020-04-21 14:23:15

  • has duplicate Feature #17645: Consider TOR security level remaining persistent after restart added