Bug #8470

Clean up APT preferences post-migration to Tor Browser

Added by intrigeri 2014-12-21 19:57:22 . Updated 2015-02-24 22:47:25 .

Status:
Resolved
Priority:
Normal
Assignee:
Category:
Target version:
Tails_1.3
Start date:
2014-12-21
Due date:
% Done:

100%

Feature Branch:
bugfix/8470-clean-up-apt-pinning
Type of work:
Code
Blueprint:

Starter:
Affected tool:
Browser
Deliverable for:

Description

We still have APT pinning for e.g. xul-ext-https-everywhere and xul-ext-noscript, that we don’t ship anymore from Debian packages (but instead using the copy from the Tor Browser).

Subtasks

History

#1 Updated by Tails 2014-12-21 19:59:06

  • Status changed from Confirmed to In Progress

Applied in changeset commit:34749bcf975a1aaaf96788713f7c98fc72fc80b1.

#2 Updated by intrigeri 2014-12-21 20:01:00

  • % Done changed from 0 to 10
  • Feature Branch set to bugfix/8470-clean-up-apt-pinning

#3 Updated by intrigeri 2014-12-21 20:25:27

  • Assignee deleted (intrigeri)
  • % Done changed from 10 to 50
  • QA Check set to Ready for QA

#4 Updated by alant 2014-12-23 18:15:51

  • Assignee set to intrigeri
  • QA Check changed from Ready for QA to Dev Needed

I reviewed the branch and I’m happy with the code the (empty) apt suite as well as with the result. I’m wondering though:

  • should we still advertize these two extensions in doc/about/features and in doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser? They are actually just part of the torbrowser.
  • why do we still install xul-ext-torbutton from debian repositories?

#5 Updated by BitingBird 2014-12-24 02:14:05

Maybe we can remove the details from “features”, but we definitly want to leave an explanation somewhere about noscript, because users ask a lot of questions about it, and the page “Tor Browser” seems a good place to keep this information available.

#6 Updated by intrigeri 2014-12-24 11:54:18

> I reviewed the branch and I’m happy with the code the (empty) apt suite as well as with the result. I’m wondering though:

> * should we still advertize these two extensions in doc/about/features and in doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser? They are actually just part of the torbrowser.

No idea. Please file a dedicated ticket about that, since it’s entirely orthogonal to this one.

> * why do we still install xul-ext-torbutton from debian repositories?

Because we patch it.

=> please merge?

#7 Updated by intrigeri 2014-12-24 12:02:51

  • Assignee changed from intrigeri to alant
  • QA Check changed from Dev Needed to Ready for QA

#8 Updated by intrigeri 2014-12-24 12:03:18

  • % Done changed from 50 to 80

#9 Updated by alant 2014-12-24 15:57:18

>> should we still advertize these two extensions in doc/about/features and in doc/anonymous_internet/Tor_Browser? They are actually just part of the torbrowser.
> No idea. Please file a dedicated ticket about that, since it’s entirely orthogonal to this one.

I don’t care that much, just wondering. Please file a ticket if you find it relevant.

>> why do we still install xul-ext-torbutton from debian repositories?
> Because we patch it.

OK I’m convinced.

#10 Updated by alant 2014-12-24 15:58:10

  • Status changed from In Progress to Fix committed
  • Assignee deleted (alant)
  • % Done changed from 80 to 100
  • QA Check changed from Ready for QA to Pass

#11 Updated by intrigeri 2014-12-24 16:09:49

>>> why do we still install xul-ext-torbutton from debian repositories?
>> Because we patch it.

> OK I’m convinced.

(actually, just checked: that’s in the design doc already :)

#12 Updated by BitingBird 2015-01-04 17:26:15

  • Category deleted (176)
  • Affected tool set to Browser

#13 Updated by BitingBird 2015-02-24 22:47:25

  • Status changed from Fix committed to Resolved