Bug #7502
Unsafe Browser is not accessible
20%
Description
In Tails 1.0.1 and 1.1 RC1, the unsafe browser is fully inaccessible, probably because it’s launched in chroot mode, and the variable “DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS” isn’t set.
Subtasks
Related issues
Related to Tails - Bug #9767: IBus input methods cannot be used in the chrooted browsers | Confirmed | 2015-07-19 | |
Related to Tails - Bug #11755: Dogtail does not work for X applications running as non-amnesia users | In Progress | 2016-08-31 | |
Related to Tails - Bug #7503: The Persistent Volume Assistant is not readable by Orca | Confirmed | 2014-07-06 | |
Related to Tails - Bug #9051: Tor Launcher is not accessible | Confirmed | 2015-03-14 | |
Related to Tails - Feature #12213: Wayland in Tails 5.0 (Bullseye) | In Progress | 2017-09-02 |
History
#1 Updated by geb about 11 years ago
- Status changed from New to Confirmed
#2 Updated by sajolida about 11 years ago
- Subject changed from Unsafe browser is just inaccessible. to Unsafe browser is not accessible
- Priority changed from High to Normal
#3 Updated by intrigeri about 11 years ago
- related to Bug #7503: The Persistent Volume Assistant is not readable by Orca added
#4 Updated by BitingBird about 10 years ago
- Affected tool set to Unsafe Browser
#5 Updated by sajolida about 10 years ago
- related to Bug #9051: Tor Launcher is not accessible added
#6 Updated by BitingBird about 10 years ago
- Subject changed from Unsafe browser is not accessible to Browsers are not accessible
All browsers are now confined -> enlarging the ticket (no sense in making one for each browser, since the solution for one will likely solve the problems for the others).
#7 Updated by intrigeri about 10 years ago
- Subject changed from Browsers are not accessible to Chrooted browsers are not accessible
BitingBird wrote:
> All browsers are now confined -> enlarging the ticket
Well, I’m almost certain I’ve made sure that Tor Browser’s confinement didn’t break at least the screen reader. If I’m wrong on that one, then feel free to revert to the more generic title you’ve set. Let’s not state that things are broken before double-checking that they are.
#8 Updated by sajolida about 10 years ago
I’m pretty sure that Orca wasn’t working in Tor Browser before AppArmor confinement, and that it kept on not working (not reading what’s on the web pages).
On the other hand, I understand that chrooted browsers and apparmor-confined and two different kind of beast that might require two different solutions, so I agree with intrigeri on keeping a more specific name about chrooting.
#9 Updated by intrigeri about 10 years ago
> I’m pretty sure that Orca wasn’t working in Tor Browser before AppArmor confinement, and that it kept on not working (not reading what’s on the web pages).
I’ve just verified that it works fine in Tails 1.3.2 when Tor Browser is started after Orca.
#10 Updated by sajolida about 10 years ago
- related to
Bug #9260: Orca reads neither Tor Browser nor Thunderbird if started after it added
#11 Updated by sajolida about 10 years ago
Yes, Orca doesn’t see Tor Browser at all if Tor Browser is started before Orca.
If Tor Browser is started after Orca, the screen is read somehow but I made Tor Browser crash many times.
I created two tickets for those different issues: Bug #9260 and Bug #9261.
#12 Updated by intrigeri about 10 years ago
- related to Bug #9767: IBus input methods cannot be used in the chrooted browsers added
#13 Updated by emmapeel about 10 years ago
Meh. Just tested Tails/Jessie and Orca reads the alerts for the Unsafe Browser, but does not read the contents of the Browser screen at all… tested with
tails-i386-feature_jessie-1.5-20150731T0408Z-9946a87.iso, downloading a more recent now.
#14 Updated by intrigeri about 10 years ago
Thanks for the report!
> Meh. Just tested Tails/Jessie and Orca reads the alerts for the Unsafe Browser,
Not surprising, the warning dialog runs as the amnesia user.
> but does not read the contents of the Browser screen at all…
Not very surprising either (we did nothing to fix that in feature/jessie AFAIK).
#15 Updated by anonym about 9 years ago
While the chroot part might make this case harder, it is actually the case that any process running as a different user than amnesia is not “accessible” (poor wording, btw), e.g. Tails Upgrader. Beyond the obvious, i.e. that this is bad for people in need of a screen reader, it is also bad for our automated test suite, given that dogtail uses the same interface.
I’m tempted to change the subject of this title to “GUI applications running as non-amnesia lack accessibility support”.
Some related docs:
#16 Updated by anonym about 9 years ago
In related news (copy-pasted from Feature #10900#note-8):
It’s worth noting that despite the fact that synaptic
runs as root, dogtail can deal with it! Wow! Is this due to /usr/bin/synaptic-pkexec
? It would be amazing if that is the case, and we can use that for the chroot browsers and other applications run as non-amnesia
in the X session.
I tried this, which started the Unsafe Browser, but still no accessibility support:
pkexec \
env DISPLAY=$DISPLAY \
XAUTHORITY=$XAUTHORITY \
SUDO_USER=$USER \
PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/sbin:/sbin:/usr/sbin \
/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser
with /usr/share/polkit-1/actions/com.tails.pkexec.unsafe-browser.policy
(which is an adapted copy of synaptic
’s) as:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE policyconfig PUBLIC
"-//freedesktop//DTD PolicyKit Policy Configuration 1.0//EN"
"http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/PolicyKit/1/policyconfig.dtd">
<policyconfig>
<action id="com.tails.pkexec.unsafe-browser.policy">
<message>Authentication is required to run the Synaptic Package Manager</message>
<icon_name>unsafe-browser</icon_name>
<defaults>
<allow_any>auth_admin</allow_any>
<allow_inactive>auth_admin</allow_inactive>
<allow_active>auth_admin</allow_active>
</defaults>
<annotate key="org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path">/usr/local/sbin/unsafe-browser</annotate>
<annotate key="org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.allow_gui">true</annotate>
</action>
</policyconfig>
But it didn’t yield accessibility. Perhaps the chroot further complicates things? Also, I’m admittedly completely ignorant of PolicyKit.
#17 Updated by anonym about 9 years ago
- Status changed from Confirmed to In Progress
- % Done changed from 0 to 10
It seems that any process run as root can get accessibility via something like:
pkexec env DISPLAY=$DISPLAY XAUTHORITY=$XAUTHORITY gedit
I suspect that is because /etc/at-spi2/accessibility.conf
contains:
[...]
<!-- Allow root to connect -->
<allow user="root"/>
[...]
because if I add
[...]
<allow user="clearnet"/>
[...]
(and restart GNOME, so we get new dbus sessions and that file is read and applied again, I suppose) and then run:
xhost +
pkexec --user clearnet env DISPLAY=$DISPLAY XAUTHORITY=$XAUTHORITY gedit
then it works! E.g. dogtail’s sniff
tool can see gedit
!
So, if we find it acceptable to grant access to the AT-SPI bus to other users (aren’t we already assuming that these users has full access to the X session state?), then I guess we can get at least get tails-upgrade-frontend
to support accessibility/dogtail, and possibly also the chroot browsers, although we probably have to be more clever (i.e. make more stuff available in the chroot, perhaps /var/run/gdm3
due to XAUTHORITY
?).
I’m calling this progress! But I’m not sure I feel comfortable being the assignee, since I indeed am very ignorant of these things.
#18 Updated by intrigeri about 9 years ago
> So, if we find it acceptable to grant access to the AT-SPI bus to other users (aren’t we already assuming that these users has full access to the X session state?),
At first glance, I think we can indeed do that.
> then I guess we can get at least get tails-upgrade-frontend
to support accessibility/dogtail, and possibly also the chroot browsers, […] I’m calling this progress!
Yes! :)
> But I’m not sure I feel comfortable being the assignee, since I indeed am very ignorant of these things.
Understood. But the thing is, AFAIK nobody on our team is less ignorant of them..
#19 Updated by anonym about 9 years ago
- % Done changed from 10 to 20
- Feature Branch set to wip/feature-stretch-chroot-accessibility
I pushed a WIP branch where I did some minor progress. Essentially: I can start gedit in the chroot and have it accessible, but still not the browser.
#20 Updated by intrigeri about 9 years ago
anonym wrote:
> I pushed a WIP branch where I did some minor progress. Essentially: I can start gedit in the chroot and have it accessible, but still not the browser.
Looks like it might be related to Bug #9260.
#21 Updated by intrigeri about 9 years ago
- related to Bug #11755: Dogtail does not work for X applications running as non-amnesia users added
#22 Updated by intrigeri about 8 years ago
- related to deleted (
Bug #9051: Tor Launcher is not accessible)
#23 Updated by intrigeri about 8 years ago
- related to deleted (
Bug #7503: The Persistent Volume Assistant is not readable by Orca)
#24 Updated by intrigeri about 8 years ago
- related to deleted (
)Bug #9260: Orca reads neither Tor Browser nor Thunderbird if started after it
#25 Updated by intrigeri about 8 years ago
- Parent task set to Feature #14522
#26 Updated by intrigeri about 8 years ago
- related to Bug #7503: The Persistent Volume Assistant is not readable by Orca added
#27 Updated by Anonymous about 7 years ago
- related to Bug #9051: Tor Launcher is not accessible added
#28 Updated by intrigeri about 6 years ago
- Subject changed from Chrooted browsers are not accessible to Unsafe Browser is not accessible
#29 Updated by intrigeri about 6 years ago
- related to Feature #12213: Wayland in Tails 5.0 (Bullseye) added
#30 Updated by intrigeri about 6 years ago
- Status changed from In Progress to Confirmed
#31 Updated by zersiax about 5 years ago
Bump. Was any more work done on this one since the progress made a couple years ago?
While Tor Browser is likely preferable in most cases, nothaving the option is a problem, especially given that it apparently affects other applications as well