Feature #5773

Revisit network fingerprinting design wrt. NTP

Added by Tails 2013-07-18 07:46:04 . Updated 2015-01-08 09:58:19 .

Status:
Confirmed
Priority:
Normal
Assignee:
Category:
Time synchronization
Target version:
Start date:
Due date:
% Done:

0%

Feature Branch:
Type of work:
Research
Blueprint:

Starter:
0
Affected tool:
Deliverable for:

Description

What kind of fingerprinting resistance a system like Tails can reasonably pretend to, at the network scale? How safe is the current "Tor, nothing else, no NTP"? Shall we emmit a fake NTP query (when others that usually do) and drop it, as suggested by adrelanos?

See "secure and simple network time (hack)" thread or tor-talk, around July 2012.

Also see discussion about fingerprinting on Time syncing.

Subtasks

Related issues

Related to Tails - Feature #5774: Robust time syncing In Progress 2015-05-17
Related to Tails - Feature #5424: Think about tordate htpdate changes Rejected
Blocked by Tails - Feature #5975: Update design documentation about network fingerprinting Rejected

History

#1 Updated by intrigeri 2013-07-19 01:46:06

  • Type of work set to Code

Type of work: Code

#2 Updated by intrigeri 2013-10-04 06:36:16

  • Assignee set to anonym
  • Starter set to No

#3 Updated by BitingBird 2014-06-09 11:05:11

  • Subject changed from network fingerprint to Network fingerprint

#4 Updated by intrigeri 2014-06-21 14:39:46

  • Subject changed from Network fingerprint to Revisit network fingerprinting design wrt. NTP
  • Assignee deleted (anonym)
  • Type of work changed from Code to Research

#5 Updated by intrigeri 2014-06-21 14:40:14

  • Description updated

#6 Updated by intrigeri 2014-06-21 14:40:43

  • blocked by Feature #5975: Update design documentation about network fingerprinting added

#7 Updated by BitingBird 2015-01-04 02:59:03

#8 Updated by BitingBird 2015-01-04 03:14:00

  • related to Feature #5424: Think about tordate htpdate changes added

#9 Updated by intrigeri 2015-01-08 09:58:19

  • Category set to Time synchronization