Tails

#1 Updated by intrigeri 2018-08-07 08:16:06

> * Disable double-clicking as a trigger for maximizing/un-maximizing Tor Browser.
> * Disable dragging to the top of the screen as a trigger for maximizing Tor Browser.

My 2 technical cts: I don’t think we can do that without either disabling these behavior for all apps (which would create other UX problems) or deeply patching GNOME Shell.

I’ll let sajolida handle this.

#2 Updated by huertanix 2018-08-07 20:14:44

intrigeri wrote:
>
> My 2 technical cts: I don’t think we can do that without either disabling these behavior for all apps (which would create other UX problems) or deeply patching GNOME Shell.
>

Thanks for the feedback. I wonder if it may be possible to create a custom GNOME extension (https://extensions.gnome.org/) that can selectively disable maximize functionality for only certain apps? If that’s possible to do from an extension level that may help us avoid deep surgery in the GNOME codebase itself.

#3 Updated by intrigeri 2018-08-08 05:36:46

> Thanks for the feedback. I wonder if it may be possible to create a custom GNOME extension (https://extensions.gnome.org/) that can selectively disable maximize functionality for only certain apps?

I believe this would currently be doable with a GNOME Shell extension, because they can override/replace/extend basically every part of GNOME Shell via monkeypatching. But I don’t think that’s viable in the long run:

• Monkey patching such a core feature of GNOME Shell feels scary and potentially hard to maintain across changes of the GNOME Shell internals.
• The GNOME project has started to reconsider this design because it gives extensions too much power, including crashing the Shell. It’s unclear yet what the future will look like but I would personally bet on a restricted API for extensions. Ensuring doing what you’re suggesting is part of that API would require quite some work (communication, negotiation, code).

Now, I’m no expert at GNOME Shell extensions, I did not look at the code, and it may very well be that it’s currently doable with a very simple GNOME Shell extension, not so hard to maintain (and worst case we drop it, too bad), and the current extension “API” will probably survive for a few more years.

#6 Updated by huertanix 2018-08-20 18:37:24

sajolida wrote:

> I found other tickets on the Tor trac that would actually provide better solutions to the same problem, but allowing users to “Undo” the maximizing:
>
> * https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/16364
> * https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20260
>
> And I think that’s the way forward.
>
> I commented on Tor:#20260, pointing to this ticket and explaining why this issue affects Tails users a bit more severely.
>

Sounds good. If there’s a way for Tor Browser itself to solve accidental resizing across all supported operating systems that would be the ideal option.

> Also: do these people find how to de-maximize their window after maximizing it by mistake?

Not right away; Usually a trainer points out the browser fingerprinting issue, then the trainee asks how to restore, which I explain with the caveat that JavaScript could be used to detect the new window size even if it was only maximized once for even the briefest period of time, etc.