Feature #11884

Document using Tor bridges to work around missing entry guards

Added by Anonymous 2016-10-20 03:16:19 . Updated 2016-12-22 14:32:05 .

Status:
Confirmed
Priority:
Low
Assignee:
Category:
Tor configuration
Target version:
Start date:
2016-10-20
Due date:
% Done:

0%

Feature Branch:
Type of work:
End-user documentation
Blueprint:

Starter:
Affected tool:
Deliverable for:

Description

consider adding the manual bridge setting as a workaround for the lack of guard nodes by advising advanced users of tails to use the manual tor configuration with chosen entry guards without compromising the amnesic nature of tails

ether in the documentation or over a gui interface within tails

Subtasks

Related issues

Related to Tails - Feature #11732: Make entry guard persistent across reboot Confirmed 2016-08-26
Related to Tails - Feature #8825: Provide default bridges Confirmed 2015-01-30

History

#1 Updated by intrigeri 2016-10-24 10:46:45

FWIW using stable bridges is already an available workaround. Granted, it’s not documented.

#2 Updated by sajolida 2016-11-01 12:42:02

  • Priority changed from Normal to Low
  • Type of work changed from Discuss to End-user documentation
  • Starter set to Yes

We could add a tip about using bridges as replacements for entry guards
near “Tails does not use the entry guards mechanism of Tor” in
/doc/about/fingerprint.

#3 Updated by sajolida 2016-11-01 12:42:52

  • Subject changed from guard node workaround to Document using Tor bridges to work around missing entry guards
  • Status changed from New to Confirmed
  • Priority changed from Low to Normal
  • Type of work changed from End-user documentation to Discuss
  • Starter deleted (Yes)

#4 Updated by sajolida 2016-11-01 12:43:26

  • related to Feature #11732: Make entry guard persistent across reboot added

#5 Updated by segfault 2016-11-05 00:10:34

Stable bridges would of course allow location tracking just like stable entry guards would, right? IIUC the only advantage is that an adversary might not know that the bridge is a Tor node, which makes it harder to track the user.

#6 Updated by intrigeri 2016-11-05 07:19:03

> Stable bridges would of course allow location tracking just like stable entry guards would, right? IIUC the only advantage is that an adversary might not know that the bridge is a Tor node, which makes it harder to track the user.

Another advantage is that one can use bridges to workaround missing entry guards in current Tails :)

#7 Updated by emmapeel 2016-12-22 14:32:05

  • Category set to Tor configuration
  • Priority changed from Normal to Low
  • Type of work changed from Discuss to End-user documentation

We have discussed this ticket on the December contributors meeting
(https://tails.boum.org/contribute/meetings/201612/) and decided to give it a low prority (it would be good to have, but nobody has commited to do it yet) as we will be able to provide entry guards in some months.

The proposal makes sense, although it will be a solution only for expert users.

Also it was suggested to add the explanation to the “Confirmation attacks” on doc/about/warning, and mention the risk/benefit decision one must make about location tracking.

#8 Updated by Anonymous 2018-08-18 12:39:20